The Great Strategic Triangle by Arbatov, Alexei & Dvorkin, Vladimir
APRIL 2013
THE GREAT  
STRATEGIC 
TRIANGLE 
Alexei Arbatov and  
Vladimir Dvorkin
APril 2013
 THE GREAT 
 STRATEGIC
 TRIANGLE
 Alexei Arbatov and 
Vladimir Dvorkin
© 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
The Carnegie Moscow Center and the Carnegie Endowment do not take 
institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the 
authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of  the Endowment, its staff, 
or its trustees.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or 
by any means without written permission from the Carnegie Moscow Center or 
Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to
Carnegie Moscow Center 
16/2 Tverskaya 
Moscow, 125009, Russia 
Tel: +7 (495) 935 8904 
Fax: +7 (495) 935 8906 
info@Carnegie.ru
This publication can be downloaded at no cost at Carnegie.ru
CP 178
Scientific editor: Natalia Bubnova
Translator: Ivan Nechepurenko
Scientific and technical support: Petr Topychkanov
Publications manager: Veronica Lavrikova
Designer: Yakov Krasnovsky
Composition: Yuri Mosyagin 
Summary 1
Introduction 3
The Peculiarities of Relations Based  
on Nuclear Deterrence  4
The Role of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Doctrines 14
China and Missile Defense Systems 19
Conventionally Armed Strategic Missiles 25
China and Nuclear Arms Limitations 29
Preconditions for Chinese Participation in the  
Arms Reduction Process 34
Conclusion 37
Notes 41
About the Authors 47
Carnegie Moscow Center 48
Contents

1Summary
The “Great Triangle” of the Asia-Pacific region formed by the United States, 
Russia, and China is particularly important in both geopolitical and military-
strategic terms. The strategic arsenals and military programs of the two tradi-
tional superpowers and the steady buildup of the nuclear and missile capabili-
ties of China, the newly emergent superpower of the twenty-first century, give 
global significance to the Great Triangle they form. 
Key Features of Great-Triangle Relations
• The United States and Russia maintain a relationship based on nuclear 
parity, mutual nuclear deterrence, and a forty-year experience of arms 
limitation and reduction agreements.
• Unlike the United States and Russia, China’s approach to strategic stability 
is not based on missile and nuclear parity and mutually assured destruc-
tion. China is the only one of the “big five” nuclear powers that does not 
provide information on its nuclear forces.
• If China’s nuclear forces are as limited as they are believed to be, they 
would be unable to deliver a retaliatory strike and are operationally most 
likely oriented toward a preemptive attack. The Chinese second-strike 
capability is only viable if China has hidden missile reserves. 
• China must be taken into consideration when discussing subsequent U.S.-
Russian initiatives on arms limitations and reductions. 
• China would join the disarmament process only if its concessions regard-
ing transparency and weapons limitations are offset by U.S. and Russian 
concessions.
Incentives for China to Participate in the Disarmament Process
• The United States could commit to cease its buildup of sea- and land-
based ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets in the Pacific Ocean.
• The United States and Russia must assume an obligation that China will 
be able to take part, in a format acceptable to Beijing, in BMD coopera-
tion projects that the two superpowers agree upon.
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• One such project might be an Asia-Pacific joint center for the exchange 
of missile launch data. This center would be similar to the Russia-United 
States and Russia-NATO centers, which were initiated or discussed in 
relation to Europe but never became operational.
• The United States and Russia could proceed with negotiations on the next 
strategic arms reduction treaty including limitations on conventionally 
armed strategic weapon systems. This would fulfill the necessary precon-
dition for China to also limit its precision-guided missiles armed with 
conventional warheads that are indistinguishable from nuclear warheads.
• Progress must be made in limiting U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons (excluding, in spite of the NATO position, their redeployment 
from Europe to Asia). This would establish the necessary conditions for 
limiting the Chinese intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. 
3Even a journey of 1,000 li starts with a first step.
—Ancient Chinese Proverb
Introduction
The shift of the nuclear disarmament process from bilateral (between Russia 
and the United States) to multilateral has increasingly drawn the attention 
of politicians and experts across the world. At a meeting with experts at the 
Sarov Federal Nuclear Center on February 24, 2012, president-to-be Vladimir 
Putin declared: “We will not disarm unilaterally. . . .  All nuclear powers should 
participate in this process. We cannot disarm while other nuclear powers are 
building up their arms.”1
In this context, the “Great Triangle” of the Asia-Pacific region formed by 
the United States, Russia, and China is of particular importance, both in geo-
political and in military-strategic terms. Although such a geostrategic con-
struction may naturally appear to be rather arbitrary, the parameters of the 
nuclear arsenals and major military programs of the two traditional superpow-
ers, combined with the steady improvement of the nuclear missile capabilities 
of the newly emergent superpower of the twenty-first century, attach global 
significance to the triangle they form. 
This triangle has an important regional dimension as well, in that other 
nuclear states (India, North Korea, and Pakistan) adjoin it in Asia. It is directly 
or indirectly linked to military, political, territorial, and economic issues of 
both international and intranational relations in the Western Pacific and 
Southeast Asia. 
For the foreseeable future, the Asia-Pacific region will play an increasingly 
important role in both the global economy and international security. Both 
Russia and the United States have officially announced that their national 
strategies are being redirected to focus on this region. The course of events 
in the region will greatly influence the level of conflicts across the globe, the 
dynamics of military competition among nations, and the prospects for arms 
limitation and nonproliferation. Thus, the nature of the military and political 
relations among China, Russia, and the United States merits closer examina-
tion, particularly with respect to strategic and other nuclear weapons, which 
will have a decisive impact on regional and global security.
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The Peculiarities of Relations 
Based on Nuclear Deterrence 
Military-strategic relations within the Great Triangle are intertwined into a 
complex knot of common interests and disagreements relating to offensive 
and defensive strategic (and nonstrategic) weapons. 
Russia and the United States
Russia and the United States possess the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons 
in the world. The total number of nuclear weapons that each side possesses 
exceeds the combined total number belonging to the remaining seven nuclear-
weapon states. At the same time, nuclear stockpiles in both Russia and the 
United States have consistently been reduced (and the weapons of the two 
countries modernized at quite a moderate pace), while the nuclear capabilities 
of third countries (primarily of China, India, and Pakistan) have been growing 
steadily both in quantity and quality. 
The United States
According to data exchanged under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START), the U.S. strategic nuclear forces (SNFs) consist of 806 
deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers armed (under the treaty’s 
counting rules) with 1,722 warheads.2 The land-based component of the U.S. 
nuclear triad consists of 500 silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs), some of which have single warheads while others have 
three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for a total of 
about 550 warheads. Under the framework of the 2010 New START Treaty, 
all of these ICBMs are to be reconfigured for single warheads between 2013 
and 2017.3
The sea-based component of the triad consists of fourteen Trident Ohio-
class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each of which can carry 
24 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with eight 
MIRVs apiece. Four other submarines of this type have been converted to 
carry sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) armed with conventional payloads 
(154 missiles aboard each submarine, 616 in total). With two submarines cur-
rently under repair, the SLBMs are not considered deployed. Finally, Trident 
II SLBMs are counted as carrying not eight warheads but an average of four. 
This amounts to twelve submarines with 288 missiles and 1,152 warheads. 
Of these submarines, eight are based in and patrol the Pacific Ocean and six 
patrol the Atlantic Ocean. 
The air component consists of heavy bombers, of which 93 are B-52H 
Stratofortresses and 21 are B-2 Spirits. There are currently 44 B-52H and 
sixteen B-2 bombers in service, armed with 350 air-launched cruise missiles 
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and 150 air bombs. In addition, 67 B-1B bombers have been converted to 
conventional bombers. There are currently no combat-ready heavy bombers 
on combat alert (in the past, a number of them have always been held ready, 
fueled, and armed), and their nuclear bombs and missiles have been placed 
into storage at Air Force bases. In consideration of this circumstance, the 
new treaty counts heavy bombers as having one nuclear warhead each. At a 
realistically probable immediate heavy bomber loading, the U.S. SNFs would 
actually have about 2,000 warheads, rather than 1,722.
The United States currently has about 500 nonstrategic or tactical nuclear 
weapons, although official information on this subject has been rather ambig-
uous. They consist of 100 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles for nuclear 
attack submarines (according to the 2010 announcement, all of these mis-
siles were to have been scrapped) and 400 free-fall air bombs, of which about 
200 are stored at six U.S. Air Force storage facilities in five NATO coun-
tries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey). These bombs 
are designed to be delivered by F-16 U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers, as well 
as by the analogous Belgian and British aircraft and German-Italian combat 
Tornado-type aircraft. About 2,800 strategic warheads are stored in reserve, 
while up to 3,100 await decommissioning.4
The U.S. nuclear forces development program does not provide for building 
any new ballistic missiles, bombers, or strategic submarines for the foreseeable 
future. The service life of the Minuteman III missile has been extended to 
2030. The modified Trident II SLBMs and Ohio-class submarines must stay 
in service until 2030–2040. The U.S. Air Force is developing a new advanced 
cruise missile (Experimental Cruise Missile) and has begun the development 
of a next-generation bomber for the period beyond 2020.
According to the Department of Defense, once it reaches the limits stipu-
lated under the New START Treaty, the U.S. nuclear triad will consist of 420 
Minuteman III ICBMs, fourteen Ohio-class submarines with 240 Trident II 
SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers.5 In terms of nonstra-
tegic nuclear arms, the decision has been made to decommission all nuclear-
armed Tomahawk SLCMs but to retain and upgrade the B61 air bombs. It 
is possible that the F-35 fifth-generation fighter will be 
certified for these bombs. 
In recent years, the United States has shifted its empha-
sis somewhat from the traditional nuclear deterrence 
strategy to strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) and 
strategic conventional precision-guided munitions (cruise 
missiles, advanced hypersonic weapons of the Prompt 
Global Strike program). Although these systems are 
directed at third countries, they will still have an effect 
upon the strategic balance and negotiations between 
Russia and the United States.
In recent years, the United States has 
shifted its emphasis somewhat from 
the traditional nuclear deterrence 
strategy to strategic ballistic missile 
defense and strategic conventional 
precision-guided munitions.
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The Russian Federation 
In contrast to the United States, Russia has increased its emphasis on nuclear 
deterrence both at the global level and regionally (judging from some indirect 
indications).6 
According to data exchanged under the New START Treaty, Russia’s stra-
tegic nuclear forces comprise 491 deployed launchers and 1,499 warheads.7 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that 
Russian ground missile forces as part of the strategic nuclear forces have 322 
launchers and ICBMs equipped with 1,087 warheads, including 50 silo-based 
heavy RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) ICBMs (each with ten MIRVs), 48 RS-18 (SS-19) 
missiles (each with six warheads), 135 road-mobile RS-12M Topol (SS-25) single 
warhead missiles, 56 silo-based and eighteen road-mobile RS-12M2 Topol-M 
(SS-27) missiles with single warheads, and fifteen RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) 
MIRVed missiles with six warheads each.8
The Russian sea-based strategic leg consists of twelve strategic missile sub-
marines carrying 144 missiles and 512 warheads, including six Delta IV-class 
submarines (Project 667BDRM, Delfin) with 96 RSM-54 (SS-N-23 Skiff) mis-
siles, each carrying four warheads. With one of the submarines currently being 
overhauled, only five submarines and 80 deployed missiles are included in 
the count.9 The Pacific Fleet has three older (Project 667BDR, Kalmar) sub-
marines carrying R-29R (SS-N-18) missiles armed with three warheads each. 
In addition, one Typhoon-class submarine (Project 941 Akula) serves as a 
test platform for the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-32). One Yuri Dolgorukiy-class 
submarine (Project 955 Borei) completed sea trials in 2010 and was commis-
sioned in January 2013. It is equipped with the same Bulava missiles.10 Another 
submarine of this class, Alexander Nevsky, is undergoing tests. 
The strategic air force component consists of 76 aircraft: 63 Tu-95MS6 and 
Tu-95MS16 (Bear H) and thirteen Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers.11 Under the 
provisions of the new treaty, they are counted as 76 launchers and 76 war-
heads; however, in reality they can carry a total of 820 X-55 (AS-15 Kent) 
air-launched cruise missiles.12 Thus, the Russian strategic nuclear forces are 
actually armed not with 1,499 warheads but with more than 2,000.13
Information relating to Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces is even scarcer 
than information relating to those of the United States. According to foreign 
sources, Russia currently possesses about 730 tactical nuclear air-launched 
missiles and bombs that can be delivered by 150 medium-range Tu-22M 
(Backfire) bombers and Su-24 (Fencer) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers. 
In addition, there are about 700 antiship, antisubmarine, and antiaircraft mis-
siles, as well as depth charges and ship and submarine torpedoes, including 
long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles. About 430 nuclear warheads 
are attributed to the S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) and other air defense systems, 
and approximately 160 warheads to tactical missiles of the ground forces.14
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The overall nonstrategic nuclear arsenal that could be operationally deployed 
is estimated to be about 2,000 warheads, with another approximately 2,000 
explosive devices in storage and slated for disposal.15 According to Russian 
military and political leaders, all nonstrategic nuclear weapons have already 
been placed into storage at central storage facilities.16
Unclassified sections of the development program for the Russian strategic 
nuclear forces provide above all for the continued deployment of the silo-
based and road-mobile MIRV-equipped RS-24 Yars ICBMs. In addition, plans 
have been announced to develop a liquid-fueled, silo-based heavy ICBM with 
multiple warheads.17
At the heart of Russia’s naval strategic program lies the new submarine 
design, Project 955, one of which has already entered service, with three more 
at various stages of construction. Plans call for building eight new ballistic 
missile submarines by 2020, to be equipped with the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-
32) SLBMs. Six submarines from the previous design, Project 667, have been 
equipped with the modified RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) SLBMs.18
The Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic bomber continues to be built for the Air 
Force (one every couple of years). In addition, a new air-launched cruise missile 
system is under development in both a nuclear and conventional payload config-
uration (X-555 and X-101/102).19 Next-generation strategic bombers (the PAK 
DA) are at the early stages of development and are for the long-term future. 
The future composition of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will depend upon 
the rate at which outdated systems deployed in the 1980s and 1990s can be 
decommissioned, as well as how quickly new weapons can be deployed. Since 
more weapons are being withdrawn from service than are being deployed, the 
overall number of nuclear arms is declining. The New START Treaty there-
fore does not affect Russia’s nuclear capability to any great extent. By 2020, for 
example, Russia could have about 1,500 warheads on land- and sea-launched 
missiles, including about 900 on 300 ICBMs (RS-12M2 Topol-M, RS-23 Yars, 
new heavy ICBM) and approximately 600 on 100 RSM-54 Sineva and RSM-56 
Bulava SLBMs, deployed on Project 667 and Project 955 (Yuri Dolgorukiy–
class) submarines.20 
Thus, the Russian strategic nuclear forces comprise at most 450 launchers 
and 1,550 warheads overall (based on the counting rules of the new treaty). 
If the new heavy ICBM is deployed, it would add a certain number of carriers 
and warheads to the total for the year 2020 but could destabilize the strategic 
balance due to the greater concentration of warheads on a smaller number of 
relatively vulnerable launchers.
Based on the two countries’ arsenals and the decisions that underlie them, 
the conclusion may be made that Russia and the United States have main-
tained a classic relationship based on mutual nuclear deterrence (the concept 
of mutually assured destruction) and approximate strategic parity. For the 
past forty years, this has also served as the foundation for their arms control 
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negotiations and agreements on principles of “equality and equal security” 
and “strategic stability.”
The New START Treaty once again codified this relationship, at reduced 
quantitative levels. Each side was limited to a maximum of 700 deployed mis-
siles and bombers (800 counting non-deployed missile launchers and heavy 
bombers) and 1,550 nuclear warheads. These numbers were to be achieved 
by 2018, and the treaty itself is to expire in 2021. In comparison with START 
I (signed more than twenty years ago), the new treaty reduces the number of 
warheads nearly fourfold and the number of delivery vehicles by two and a 
half times. In addition, the new treaty is structured much more simply, and its 
verification regime is more modest.21 
However, even in this regard asymmetry between the sides has been grow-
ing, which will create difficulties in further negotiations. Russia has linked the 
prospects for conducting future negotiations with its demand to resolve dis-
agreements over missile defense and with the prohibition of space weapons, 
while the United States has linked them with the limitation of nonstrategic 
nuclear arms. Both powers have raised the question of including third states 
in the nuclear arms limitation process, with Russia suggesting the UK and 
France (since they are allied with the United States), while the United States 
has raised the issue of China (as an independent party in the strategic balance). 
Russia’s position with regard to China has been ambiguous and has not distin-
guished it from other nuclear states. 
Nevertheless, within the framework of the new treaty (or outside of it), 
the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States will undergo 
essentially no significant change for the foreseeable future, leaving neither side 
with the capability to conduct a disarming first strike under any scenario of 
nuclear conflict. According to models advanced by independent experts, under 
any conditions of a counterforce attack the defending side would still have 
several hundred nuclear warheads with which to retaliate, which would be 
sufficient to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the hypothetical aggres-
sor. Following deployment of the U.S. ballistic missile defense and Russian 
Air-Space Defense systems, the retaliatory capacity of the opponent could be 
diminished by at most a dozen or slightly more warheads.22 
Thus, the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States will 
continue to be relatively stable for the foreseeable future, despite the impact of 
perturbing military and political factors. Moreover, discounting the influence 
of third-country nuclear states, strategic stability under the bilateral frame-
work will be secured even if the two countries succeed in concluding the next 
arms reduction treaty by limiting the number of warheads for each country 
to 1,000 (provided that the high survivability of strategic forces is ensured). 
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The United States and China 
A state of mutual nuclear deterrence exists between these two powers, although 
it very asymmetrically favors the United States. In recent years, the United 
States has been shifting the emphasis of its nuclear strategy in the direction of 
the Pacific Ocean, primarily with China in mind (as noted above, eight of the 
fourteen Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are deployed in the 
Pacific). In focusing on this area, Washington has made developing its missile 
defense a much higher priority there than in the Euro-Atlantic area (90 percent 
of the BMD radars and interception assets are situated in the Asia-Pacific), and 
it is also concentrating on the deployment and development of high-precision 
conventional strategic systems, including Prompt Global Strike programs. 
At the same time, in contrast to its relations with Russia, the United States 
has never officially acknowledged a relationship with China based on mutual 
nuclear deterrence or accepted that China will eventually achieve parity with 
the United States. It would appear that Washington has no intention of offer-
ing such relations as a “gift” to China, the new superpower of the twenty-first 
century (similar to the way that the United States at one time had not wanted 
to recognize mutual deterrence with the Soviet Union, which then had to win 
parity for itself after first passing through three different cycles of the arms 
race and the very dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962). 
China, for its part, insists on its right to mutual deterrence with the United 
States, with an emphasis on “minimum nuclear deterrence,” and thus has been 
gradually increasing the number of its ICBMs and SLBMs. Along the way, 
China has been building precision-guided conventional intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles that could potentially be used against Taiwan and the U.S. 
Navy and tactical ballistic missiles, and it is also conducting experiments with 
missile defense and antisatellite weapons. 
According to independent experts, China’s strategic forces (based on the 
New START Treaty’s classification) consist of 93 land- and sea-launched bal-
listic missiles.23 
The land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces consists of the 
Strategic Missile Force and missile systems of the People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA) ground force. China’s Strategic Missile Force is represented by the so-
called Second Artillery of the PLA and includes eighteen obsolete silo-based 
liquid-fueled DongFeng 5A (CSS-4) missiles as well as 30 new solid-fueled, 
road-mobile DongFeng 31 and DongFeng 31A (CSS-9) ICBMs.
The sea-based component includes two types of ballistic missile subma-
rines: one Xia-class (type 092) with twelve single-warhead Julang-1 (CSS-N-3) 
SLBMs and two Jin-class (type 094) submarines, each carrying twelve single-
warhead Julang-2 missiles. Although the construction of Xia-class submarines 
and Julang-1 SLBMs was discontinued in the 1990s, construction of type 094 
submarines began in 2001 with at least four planned to be built (other sources 
say at least five). The two type 094 submarines that are already serving with 
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the Chinese Navy patrol the waters adjacent to China. Thus, the sea-based 
component of China’s nuclear forces consists of 36 single-warhead Julang-1/2 
SLBMs, the combat loads of which consist of 45 nuclear warheads. 
China has a significant number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs) as well as tactical ballistic missiles. The 1987 Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated all Russian (Soviet) and U.S. weapons 
of this class. China has eleven obsolete DongFeng-4 (CSS-3) IRBMs and 88 new 
road-mobile intermediate-range DongFeng-21/21A (CSS-5) missiles, as well as 
60 DongFeng-15/15A/15B (CSS-6) and DongFeng-11A (CSS-7) (the latter does 
not match the INF classification, having a range of 300 kilometers). Overall, 
China has 160 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Some IRBMs and tac-
tical ballistic missiles, apparently, are conventionally armed. 
The air-based component of China’s nuclear forces consists of the strategic 
air force, which has 60 Xian H-6 medium-range bombers, and the tactical air 
force, represented by 300 Jian-5 fighter-bombers and fighter aircraft derived 
from the Russian multirole Su-30 fighter. In addition, 120 strategic nuclear 
B-5 bombs and 320 B-4 nuclear bombs are allocated to them, for an overall 
total of 440.
The PLA ground forces are armed with two types of road-mobile systems 
capable of launching either nuclear-armed or conventional-armed missiles. 
One system is based on use of the solid-fueled DongFeng-11 (CSS-7—about 
100 units), the other on the DongHai-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (up 
to 500 units). Up to 150 nuclear warheads may be assigned to these missiles as 
nuclear payload. 
Thus, as many as about 360 nuclear reentry vehicles could come under the 
land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces. During peacetime, most 
of these warheads would be stockpiled separately from the missiles. However, 
contrary to the opinion of many experts, the Second Artillery is now adopt-
ing a continuous duty cycle for the DongFeng-31/31A (CSS-9) ICBM missile 
brigades, clearly readying these systems for immediate use upon the authoriza-
tion of the Chinese political leadership. This means that the missiles in their 
launch containers will have nuclear warheads permanently mounted on them. 
According to leading Russian experts, China has about 800 to 900 nuclear 
warheads in its current stockpile that are available for rapid deployment.24 In 
addition, approximately the same number could be held in storage as backup 
weapons and for spare parts or be earmarked for disposal. 
There is yet another aspect of utmost importance. Foreign news agencies 
and independent experts have periodically reported that the Chinese military 
has been building an extensive system of underground tunnels that could store 
large items of military hardware. These tunnels, which extend for several thou-
sand kilometers, could be capable of accommodating significant numbers of 
backup launchers with ballistic and cruise missiles or of storing nuclear weap-
ons. No other purpose has yet been identified for such extensive earthworks. 
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Unofficial sources report that new versions of the Xian H-6 medium-range 
bomber are being produced and that those already in service are undergoing 
modernization. They are equipped with new targeting and navigation equip-
ment and will have an enlarged armament payload, including air-launched 
cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The prototype for this missile is the 
DongHai ground-launched cruise missile. In an effort to modernize the land-
based component of its nuclear forces, China has placed the emphasis on fit-
ting ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads and with BMD penetration aids. 
In addition, two new ballistic missiles are under development: the DongFeng-25 
IRBM and DongFeng-41 (CSS-10) ICBM. The DongFeng-25 is built using the first 
and second stages of the DongFeng-31, arming it with MIRVs (as many as three 
reentry vehicles). This system is intended to replace the outdated DongFeng-4 
(CSS-3) IRBM. The DongFeng-41 ICBM was developed to be a versatile missile 
that could be deployed on road-mobile and rail-based launchers. It is believed 
to be equipped with six to ten MIRVs. 
As far as the sea-based component is concerned, the main effort is being 
applied to increasing the speed and improving the quality of the type 094 
class ballistic missile submarines. The JL-2 SLBM is undergoing moderniza-
tion and being equipped with MIRV warheads. In addition, the necessary 
infrastructure for nuclear submarines is being built at a naval base on Hainan 
Island in the South China Sea. A new type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarine, which is to be equipped with 24 JL-2 MIRVed SLBMs, is being 
planned for the longer term. It is expected that the first such submarine will 
be launched in 2014–2015. 
Thus, the Chinese nuclear capability has clearly been underestimated by the 
international community. It appears in all likelihood that China, which is already 
the third-largest nuclear state after the United States and Russia, is in a class of 
its own. In terms of its nuclear force levels, China surpasses all of the other six 
nuclear states combined (excluding the two superpowers). In addition, China is 
the only state aside from Russia and the United States that has the technical and 
economic capability to build up its nuclear arsenal rapidly and manyfold.
However, the balance is hugely asymmetrical in favor of the United States 
with respect to the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the strategic 
nuclear forces, as well as their command, control, and information management 
systems. As a consequence, there is no parity in the strategic balance of the two 
countries and also no state of mutually assured destruction (by retaliatory attack 
under all conditions of conflict), which is the basis of strategic stability. 
The United States has an excess of such capacity while, so far, China lacks 
it, based on the aforementioned description of its nuclear forces (in terms of 
their “operationally deployed capability”). In a hypothetical disarming (coun-
terforce) strike against China’s identified strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
forces, the United States could destroy (in all probability within a single 
launch) more than 90 percent of these military targets.25 The missile defense 
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system that is being deployed and enhanced in Asia and the Pacific by the 
United States (including the elements in Alaska and California) and its allies 
would be capable of intercepting the vast majority of the surviving Chinese 
nuclear missiles. For the foreseeable future, the strategic balance between the 
two powers will be defined by their strategic and theater offensive and defen-
sive programs and by possible agreements in this area. 
As has been noted above, the United States has never 
acknowledged any degree of mutual nuclear deterrence or 
parity with China, nor has it ever admitted that such a sit-
uation could possibly emerge in the future. As applied to 
China, the American concept of strategic stability reduces 
to ensuring transparency for the strategic nuclear forces, 
rather than maintaining a mutual second-strike capability. 
Within the U.S.-China strategic balance, mutual nuclear 
deterrence is not only highly asymmetrical but is also fur-
ther “diluted” by scenarios of regional conflict and by the 
weapons systems deployed in support of U.S. commitments to its allies and 
partners ( Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). The political ambiguity and stra-
tegic asymmetry discussed above will greatly complicate any potential negotia-
tions between the two under the classic model. 
Russia and China 
Sino-Russian strategic relations have been even more controversial and ill-
defined. Officially, neither of these two strategic allies recognizes a mutual 
nuclear deterrent component in its relations.
However, it may be assumed that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, as well 
as some of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, do serve a mission of containing 
China, as markedly implied in Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine: 
Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak 
of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conven-
tional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war). In the event of the 
outbreak of a military conflict involving the utilization of conventional means 
of attack (a large-scale war or regional war) and imperiling the very existence of 
the state, the possession of nuclear weapons may lead to such a military conflict 
developing into a nuclear military conflict.26
In terms of military logic, to mention a regional war in such a context can 
only suggest a hypothetical conflict with China. Given the geostrategic reality, 
a non-nuclear war with the United States/NATO would not be regional, since 
the United States is present in both the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic 
regions, while Russia’s existence as a state would not likely be put at risk in a 
conventional war with any other state in the region aside from China (in light 
Within the U.S.-China strategic balance, 
mutual nuclear deterrence is not only highly 
asymmetrical but is also further “diluted” 
by scenarios of regional conflict and by the 
weapons systems deployed in support of 
U.S. commitments to its allies and partners.
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of its increasing superiority in conventional forces near the Russian border in 
Eastern Siberia and the Far East).27 
A portion of China’s 50 ICBMs may target European Russian territory. All 
(or at least most) of China’s 60 IRBMs in the Shenyang and Lanzhou military 
regions could be aimed at Siberia and the Far East, as could some of China’s 
150 nuclear tactical ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.
At the same time, Russia retains a significant superiority over China in stra-
tegic and tactical nuclear weapons, given the state of China’s deployed nuclear 
forces (as discussed above). Judging from the information available, it can be 
assumed that this quantitative superiority—as well as the 
Russian ability to deliver a first or retaliatory strike—will 
continue for the foreseeable future.
It must be noted that, similarly to the United States, 
Russia has not recognized the Chinese claim to mutual 
nuclear deterrence since the Soviet period. During the 
Sino-Soviet split that lasted from the 1960s to the mid-
1980s, in addition to the large conventional army deployed along the Soviet 
border with China and in Mongolia, the Soviet Union also sought to secure 
absolute nuclear superiority in offensive and defensive weapons. Once the 
bilateral relationship had improved and a “strategic partnership” had been 
formed, the issue of mutual nuclear deterrence was shelved in political rela-
tions between the two powers.
In any case, considering the political and strategic nuances of their relations, 
Russia and China have even less of a sound basis for initiating mutual nuclear 
arms limitation talks between them than do the United States and China. 
Strategic relations between the three countries are thus very asymmetrical 
and lack any political or strategic common ground in terms of such principles 
as stability and parity. The “triangle” turns out to be not only not equal sided 
but also not regular (figure 1).
Russia retains a significant 
superiority over China in strategic 
and tactical nuclear weapons.
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Figure 1. The Strategic Triangle: Russia, the United States, and China
In addition, China keeps the size and composition of its nuclear forces 
and nuclear development program secret, which renders the possibility of any 
three-party strategic arms reduction or nuclear arms limitation talks highly 
tenuous, at least for the foreseeable future.
The Role of Nuclear Weapons 
and the Nuclear Doctrines
Of the three powers, it is the Russian national security concept and military 
doctrine that assigns nuclear weapons the greatest role. Due to the relative 
inferiority of its general purpose forces, Russia feels vulnerable to both the 
West and the East. In relations with the United States/NATO, Russia has been 
most concerned about lagging behind in missile defense and strategic non-
nuclear weapons, while in its relations with Beijing, Moscow has been quietly 
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apprehensive about the improving conventional capabilities of the People’s 
Liberation Army, especially of the ground forces in China’s northern districts. 
In light of its superiority in the most advanced conventional armaments, 
missile defense, and non-nuclear strategic weapons, the United States has put 
less emphasis on nuclear weapons than has Russia, although the U.S. nuclear 
capability remains an attribute of its great-power status and the pillar of its 
security commitments to its allies. 
Of the three states, China emphasizes nuclear weapons the least. Beijing 
is not concerned about its balance of general purpose forces with Russia or 
with the United States (or India), and China accepts its inferiority in nuclear 
weapons as a long-term reality, although it does take the U.S. missile defense 
program and the Prompt Global Strike initiative seriously.
The Russian and American nuclear doctrines (both published in 2010) are 
very similar. Each of these documents treats nuclear weapons as a means of 
last resort, but at the same time reserves the right to use them first. 
The United States 
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report says that “The fundamental role of 
U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to 
deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners. . . .  The United 
States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons 
in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or 
its allies and partners.”28 The role of nuclear weapons in deterring an attack 
with the use of conventional, chemical, or biological weapons declines. The 
United States is ready to declare that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-prolifer-
ation obligations.”29 However, this obligation does not apply to NPT nuclear 
powers or states that violate the NPT or are not party to the treaty.
Apparently implying security commitments to Japan and South Korea, the 
United States reserves the right to deter attacks with conventional weapons 
or chemical or biological weapons (as noted within “a narrow range of con-
tingencies”). In other words, nuclear weapons are seen as applicable not only 
globally (as the basis for deterring nuclear attack against the United States), but 
also for regional deterrence: to respond to a nuclear attack against U.S. allies 
or, in some cases, to respond to conventional attack or one using chemical or 
biological weapons. 
Given this reasoning, “the United States is . . . not prepared at the present 
time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole pur-
pose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which 
such a policy could be safely adopted.”30
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The Russian Federation
Russia’s most recent military doctrine stipulates that “the prevention of 
a nuclear military conflict and likewise any other military conflict, is the 
Russian Federation’s main task.”31 The document provides that “the Russian 
Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the utiliza-
tion of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and 
(or) its allies and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation 
involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the 
state is under threat.”32
In other words, Russia’s nuclear forces serve first of all to deliver a second 
strike to retaliate for an adversary’s first nuclear strike against Russia or its 
allies; second, to launch a first strike in response to an aggressor’s chemical 
or biological attack against Russia or its allies; and third, to make a first strike 
in the face of imminent national catastrophe resulting from a conventional 
attack on Russia (but not on its allies). The last option was obviously meant 
to counter threats posed by the superiority of the expanded NATO in con-
ventional forces and precision-guided munitions, as well as potential threats 
stemming from the strategic situation in the East, which is changing in a way 
not favoring Russia.
In the sections dealing with nuclear issues, there are only three major dif-
ferences between the two military doctrines. First, the United States retains 
the option of using nuclear weapons against nuclear powers and non-nuclear-
weapon states that violate the NPT (that is, theoretically against seven states: 
Russia and China, as well as Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and India, of 
which the last two, understandably, would not be potential targets of such a 
strike). Russia retains this right against nuclear-weapon states and their allies 
and partners (that is, a hypothetical total of about 40 countries). 
The second difference is that the United States allows for a first nuclear 
strike to defend its allies (referring to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and several 
NATO countries) from an attack by conventional troops and forces, while 
Russia does not plan for such a contingency. For its part, Moscow envisions 
using nuclear weapons first to retaliate against a large-scale attack with the 
use of general purpose forces, while the United States says nothing about this 
scenario (for understandable geostrategic reasons, it is not vulnerable to such 
an attack).
Third, in its deterrent strategy the United States has announced increasing 
emphasis on non-nuclear offensive and defensive systems, while decreasing 
the role of nuclear weapons. Russia considers this approach to be destabiliz-
ing and recently (with a view to the future) has increased the role of nuclear 
deterrence in ensuring its national security: the decision to create a new heavy 
ICBM system was a particularly clear expression of this. At the same time, 
Russia places great priority on the development of defensive systems under the 
Air-Space Defense program, and of precision-guided offensive conventional 
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weapons. However, these programs have not been written into the overall 
concept of strategic stability. 
China
The situation with China is much more complicated. Despite its seemingly 
cohesive and lapidary appearance, Beijing’s position and policies in the nuclear 
field are quite contradictory. 
On the one hand, China is the only one of the great powers that has offi-
cially undertaken an obligation, with no reservations, to not use nuclear weap-
ons first. The section of the Chinese “White Book,” titled “Arms Control and 
Disarmament,”33 carries an appeal to all nuclear-weapon states to “abandon 
any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, make 
an unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will they use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-
weapon-free zones . . . nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude 
a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other.”34 China’s 
approach to strategic stability differs from those of Russia and the United 
States in that it is not based on approximate missile/nuclear parity and the 
concept of mutually assured destruction (by a retaliatory strike). Concerning 
the size of the nuclear forces that China needs, it has been said that they will 
be kept to the minimum level “required for national security.”35 
On the other hand, China is the only one of the five great powers—per-
manent members of the UN Security Council and the recognized five nuclear 
powers in the NPT—that does not provide any official factual information on 
its nuclear forces and their development programs. 
In the past, when the Chinese GDP, military expenditures, and nuclear 
forces had been rather modest, this situation was quietly accepted by other 
powers, but this attitude has changed over the past decade in view of China’s 
economic growth, its military budget (which has become second only to that 
of the United States), large-scale nuclear and conventional weapon moderniza-
tion programs, impressive military parades in Tiananmen Square, and increas-
ingly ambitious foreign and military policies. 
Now, provisions such as “no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and 
under any circumstances,” “purely defensive military doctrine,” and “will 
limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level” will not be taken for 
granted. Moreover, in the absence of any official information—even of the 
most general nature—on the Chinese nuclear forces and their development 
programs, such statements may produce the opposite effect: they will be seen 
as an indication of wanting to hide the truth and lull other states into lowering 
their vigilance. 
Millennia-old Chinese traditions seem to have been revived in many areas 
of China, perhaps becoming more important than any euphonious provisions 
of current official policy of the People’s Republic. In this light, it would be 
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useful to recall the thoughts of the great Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu 
in his treatise The Art of War. Two and a half thousand years ago, when the 
inhabitants of what today is Russia and the NATO states were still wearing 
animal hides and fighting with clubs, he wrote, “All warfare is based on decep-
tion. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our 
forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy 
believe we are far away.”36
Reputable Russian experts have estimated that since the early 1960s China 
has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons-grade uranium and ten tons of 
plutonium, which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear warheads.37 
However, it is most probable that half of this fissile material is being held in 
stocks and that half of the 1,500 to 1,800 warheads that have been produced 
are in storage. Thus, as indicated above, up to 800 to 900 warheads and bombs 
could be available for operational deployment on carriers of various types,38 
all of which could reach Russia, and approximately 90 of which could reach 
the United States.
In addition, China has been trying to improve the survivability and effec-
tiveness of its land-based and space-based ballistic missile early warning sys-
tem and command and control systems, and it has conducted research and 
development in the fields of missile defense and antisatellite weapons. There 
is also a great degree of uncertainty about the tunnel structures being built in 
China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.39
This factor becomes especially important in view of the overall moderniza-
tion of the PLA’s conventional forces and China’s superiority in these forces 
over its regional neighbors. India is greatly concerned about this situation. 
It may cast doubt on U.S. security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan and encourage those states to adopt a policy of appeasement with 
regard to Beijing, or push them to seek military (including nuclear) indepen-
dence (information about the growth of such sentiments in Japan has recently 
caused a sensation).40
China’s military buildup has also been a source of concern for the countries 
of Southeast Asia with which China faces disputes over the South China Sea 
oil shelf.
Despite Russia’s ongoing plans of “strategic partnership” with China, the 
tendencies described above can have disturbing implications for Russia’s 
national security. The increasing Chinese capability of launching a nuclear 
strike on European Russian territory would diminish Russia’s advantage in 
intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons, which continue to compen-
sate for China’s superiority in conventional forces close to the area of Russian 
Siberia and the Far East. 
China’s unambiguous pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons is also rather 
questionable. It is commonly believed that a nuclear power that makes a pledge 
not to use nuclear weapons first instead relies on the second-strike capability.
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However, according to information available to other countries, China’s 
deployed nuclear forces are generally estimated to be too vulnerable and not 
efficient enough to ensure a retaliatory capability after a hypothetical disarm-
ing attack by the United States or Russia. Moreover, Chinese strategic nuclear 
forces would be incapable of launching on a warning received from an early 
warning system due to the high vulnerability and inadequate effectiveness of 
the Chinese early warning system as well as its command and control system. 
The main paradox of China’s nuclear doctrine is that if its nuclear forces are 
indeed as limited as most foreign experts seem to think, they would be unable 
to deliver a retaliatory strike and would operationally most likely be oriented 
toward landing a preemptive attack. 
The Chinese second-strike capability would be viable only if a large number 
of nuclear weapons are stored in the underground tunnels, which would be 
highly survivable and unknown to a potential adversary. 
This stockpile would not be available for immediate use 
but might be partially revealed to the world in a crisis in 
order to reinforce its deterrent effect and disrupt an oppo-
nent’s plans.
In such a case, China could be considered the larg-
est nuclear power after the United States and Russia. 
Moreover, China’s nuclear capability is apparently stron-
ger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. 
It can be speculated that the real motives behind China’s 
complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and 
“small size” but in the much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal 
than can be construed from observing the weapons deployed on its surface. 
In addition, China’s economic and technical potential would allow it to build 
up its nuclear arms rapidly. 
China and Missile Defense Systems
The fact that China could build up its nuclear forces establishes a significant, 
though unspoken, incentive for the United States and its allies to develop a 
missile defense system in the Far East. Although the immediate justification 
of this system is to intercept North Korean missiles, Washington quite prob-
ably seeks to deploy a BMD system in the region to obstruct and delay China’s 
acquisition of a nuclear deterrent potential (not to mention strategic parity 
with Washington) based on the guaranteed capability for a retaliatory strike 
against the United States. For obvious reasons, China has been even more 
concerned about these developments than Russia has been concerned about 
NATO’s BMD system. China’s response will center on developing BMD pen-
etration aids, an antisatellite system, and its own BMD.
The Chinese second-strike capability would 
be viable only if a large number of nuclear 
weapons are stored in the underground 
tunnels, which would be highly survivable 
and unknown to a potential adversary. 
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Negotiations between Russia and the United States/NATO on the coop-
erative development of the European missile defense elicited some consterna-
tion in Beijing, which perceived them as representing military rapprochement 
between the two powers against China. Russia’s proposal to develop a com-
mon “sectoral” BMD system under which each side would intercept missiles 
flying over its own territory in the direction of the other left quite a few funda-
mental questions unanswered. For example, should Russia intercept Chinese 
missiles flying over Russian territory toward the United States or Western 
Europe?
By definition, strategic missile defense is global in nature, and its elements 
(especially information systems) must all be integrated into a single complex. 
As Mikhail Khodarenok, one of the developers of the Soviet BMD system, 
put it: 
Even more confusing from an engineering and technical point of view was the 
“sectoral” principle of BMD development that Moscow pro posed. Such a system, 
even if applied only to BMD on the European con tinent, would still require at least 
a common command center, computer complex, and data communication lines, 
and the entire system would have to be controlled using unified combat algorithms.  
This would mean that all detection and tracking facilities, computer and com-
mand nodes, and interceptor launch sites would need to be linked by high-
speed, automated, and reliable lines of communication. With a mar gin of only 
a few minutes to intercept BMs [ballistic missiles] between the moment they 
are detected and identified as targets and the detonation of the interceptor’s 
warhead, such a “super-system” requires extremely comprehensive and excep-
tionally complex software to control.41
In any case, although the United States had allowed for the possibility of 
BMD cooperation with Russia, U.S. politicians and experts have never men-
tioned the possibility of carrying out such collaborative efforts with China. 
Beijing may perceive the construction of a joint or collaborative U.S.-Russia 
BMD system as an “anti-Chinese conspiracy,” which 
could result in serious complications for military and 
political relations between Russia and China, lead to an 
accelerated buildup of China’s nuclear forces, and directly 
damage Russian national security.
That is why China has always seemed to be invisibly 
present at BMD talks between Russia and the United 
States, although the problem has never been openly dis-
cussed either in Brussels or at the bilateral summits.
The failure of the negotiations temporarily eased 
Chinese concerns on this matter, but the possibility that 
the talks will resume continues to be an important fac-
tor in Chinese strategic planning, especially in light of the 
Beijing may perceive the construction of 
a joint or collaborative U.S.-Russia BMD 
system as an “anti-Chinese conspiracy,” 
which could result in serious complications 
for military and political relations between 
Russia and China, lead to an accelerated 
buildup of China’s nuclear forces, and 
directly damage Russian national security.
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fact that both Russia and the United States have made the development of 
advanced defense systems a strategic priority in their military policies and 
continue to pursue these programs on a rather wide scale. 
The United States
In addition to space-based global information systems, as of the beginning of 
2012 the U.S. missile defense system included:
• Four early warning radars: the L-band radar in Shemya (Alaska) and UHF-
band radars in Beale (California), Fylingdales (UK), and Thule (Greenland);
• Five transportable forward-based X-band AN/TPY-2 radars, three of 
which are on combat alert: Shariki (Honshū Island, Japan), Nevatim 
Desert (Israel), and Malatya Province (Turkey) (of the other two, the radar 
at Wake Island is used for BMD tests, while another radar is operated by 
the U.S. Central Command);
• The mobile sea-based X-band SBX radar mounted on a drilling rig in the 
Pacific Ocean near Adak Island (Alaska);
• Thirty ground-based interceptor missiles (GBIs), 26 of which are in Alaska 
at Fort Greely (deployed at six experimental sites and twenty combat sites), 
and four of which at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, with com-
bat control centers at Fort Greely and Colorado Springs; 
• Twenty-four ships (five cruisers and eighteen destroyers) of the Aegis 
BMD version 3 system, carrying a total of 158 interceptor missiles, of 
which 72 are the SM-2 Block IV and 86 are the SM-3 (three of these are 
the new SM-3 IB variant). Sixteen ships belong to the Pacific Fleet (five 
at Yokosuka, six at Pearl Harbor, and five at San Diego) and eight to the 
Atlantic Fleet (seven at Norfolk and one at Mayport); 
• Two THAAD units equipped with two AN/TPY-2 radars, six launchers 
for eight missiles each currently equipped with eighteen interceptor missiles; 
• Patriot missile systems: 56 launchers for sixteen missiles each, and 903 
PAC-3 missiles.
These data show that two of four large-scale early warning radars and two 
of the five transportable radars are directed at the Asia-Pacific region; all 30 
GBI strategic interceptors can reach missiles launched from the Asia-Pacific 
region; sixteen of 23 Aegis-equipped ships are deployed there. 
In addition, BMD radars and interceptors are deployed within the borders 
and on the fleets of local partners and allies of the United States. Joint research 
and development is conducted with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, 
and the Philippines (in the latter two cases it is planned).42 Specifically, there 
is a sea-based BMD layer in Yokosuka, Japan, consisting of Aegis-equipped 
ships with SM-3 1A (two cruisers) and SM-2 (seven destroyers), as well as a 
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transportable AN/TPY-2 radar and a command, control, battle management, 
and communications unit (C2BMC). In addition to American warships, an 
Aegis combat system with SM-3 1A and SM-2 missiles is installed on four 
Japanese Kongo-class destroyers and two Atago-class destroyers. The second 
Japanese BMD layer consists of Patriot theater BMD systems of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces, equipped with PAC-3 missiles. In addition, Japan plans 
to purchase THAAD systems.
In September 2009, President Obama canceled the deployment plan of 
the third BMD site in Europe in favor of the “European Phased Adaptive 
Approach,” which focused more on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic 
missile threats as opposed to threats from ICBMs (Iran had recently tested a 
2,000–2,500 km range solid-fueled missile). The phased European approach 
envisions a four-phase deployment starting with sea-based SM-3 Block IA 
interceptors on ships at sea in Phase I by 2011, SM-3 Block IB interceptors at 
sea and on land in Deveselu, Romania, in Phase II by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA 
interceptors on land in Poland and on ships by 2018 in Phase III, and finally 
SM-3 Block IIB sea- and land-based interceptors in Europe by 2020.43 
The strike components of the U.S. missile defense system by 2020 will 
include 50 GBI silo launchers in two basing areas where up to 40 GBI missiles 
will be deployed, 44 Aegis-equipped ships and two land bases, at least nine 
THAAD squadrons (27 launchers) and fifteen Patriot squadrons (60 launch-
ers). As a minimum 474 missiles will be able to intercept targets at midcourse 
phase: up to 40 GBI, 21 SM-3 IA, 373 SM-3 IB, 25 SM-3 IIA, and 25 SM-3 
IIB. At the terminal phase about 1,770 missiles will be available: 70 SM-2 
Block IV, 503 THAAD, and 1198 PAC-3.
Despite such impressive plans, by 2020 only as many as 40 GBI missiles 
on U.S. territory and 50 SM-3 IIA and SM-3 IIB interceptors in Europe will 
have strategic capabilities, in other words, would be theoretically capable of 
intercepting Russian ICBMs at the boost and midcourse phases of their tra-
jectory.44 However, this assumption ignores the effect of the penetration aids 
with which Russian missiles would be able to minimize interception attrition 
over the midcourse phase to no more than a few.
Russia
In addition to the space-based missile early warning system and command-
control layer, Russia’s Air-Space Defense system includes the A-135 BMD 
system around Moscow with three radars, as well as the short-range 53T6 
(Gazelle) and long-range 51T6 (Gorgon) silo-based missile interceptors.45 
According to retired Colonel General Viktor Esin, once the United States 
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the Russian military 
and political leadership decided to initiate a thorough modernization of all 
structural elements of the A-135 BMD system, which will remain an area mis-
sile defense system, albeit with greatly enhanced combat capabilities.46 
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In the three Air-Space Defense brigades (transferred from the Air Defense 
Forces) that defend Russia’s central industrial region are twelve regiments (32 
squadrons), armed mostly with the S-300 SAM missile system in three modi-
fications.47 The two Air Defense regiments (with two squadrons each) that 
defend the Moscow region are armed with the S-400 new-generation mobile 
SAM missiles.48
The obsolete S-300PS system, which had been introduced in 1982 and 
has not been supplied to the Russian Armed Forces since 1994, needs to be 
replaced, while the S-300PM, introduced in 1993, awaits modernization under 
the Favorit program up to the level of the S-300PMU.49
As Viktor Esin has noted, the part of Russia’s State Armaments Program 
for 2011–2020 that deals with the provision of S-400 SAM complexes to the 
troops and the development and introduction of future surface-to-air systems 
provides for supplying nine S-400 SAM regiments to the armed forces by 2015 
and for bringing the 40H6 SAM regiments to the armed forces by 2015 and 
for bringing the 40H6 SAM long-range guided missile up to required stan-
dards.50 The design and development of the Vityaz SAM system that began in 
2007 is scheduled for completion in 2013.51 State tests will be conducted so 
that the new system will enter operational service by no later than 2014. The 
development of a new-generation S-500 SAM system (started in 2011) should 
be completed in 2015.52
It is not yet clear what portion of the Air-Space Defense system will cover 
Russia’s Asian territory, but given China’s ICBM development, the defense 
of European Russia could also have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
Chinese nuclear deterrent potential. 
Overall, it should be noted that such authoritative Russian experts as Yuri 
Solomonov and Sergei Rogov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Viktor Esin, 
retired Major General Pavel Zolotarev, and Rear Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov, 
as well as others, have clearly stated that neither the current American mis-
sile defense system nor that projected over the next ten to fifteen years will 
be capable of having any significant impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent 
potential.53 This conclusion holds for the Russian strategic nuclear forces both 
under the limits set by the New START Treaty (700 delivery vehicles and 
1,550 warheads) and under a hypothetical subsequent treaty that would reduce 
the ceiling to (for example) 1,000 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles.54 
Any attempt to create a BMD system that could defend against attack by 
Russian strategic forces would consume such colossal resources and bring 
such questionable results that it would likely damage the national security of 
United States itself. Naturally, this will remain true as long as Russia contin-
ues to maintain a sufficient arsenal of survivable strategic nuclear forces and 
to carry out effective modernization of its strategic nuclear forces within the 
limits set by arms reduction treaties. 
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The same is true in evaluating the capabilities of the Russian Air-Space 
Defense system and its capability to defend against a first or retaliatory attack 
initiated by American nuclear forces. In other words, the Russian system will 
also not undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent, despite the fact that its offi-
cial purpose is to defend against “means of air-space attack,” which only the 
United States and its allies currently possess. However, in contrast to Russia, 
which has been very concerned about the American BMD system and pro-
gram, the United States does not appear apprehensive about such a prospect. 
China
The situation with regard to China is not as clear. The degree to which the 
U.S. ballistic missile defense and Russia’s Air-Space Defense system will put 
China’s nuclear deterrent capability into question will largely depend both 
on the effectiveness of these systems and the survivability of China’s nuclear 
forces. As noted above, the current survivability and combat readiness of the 
approximately 50 Chinese ICBMs and 100 medium- and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles leave little hope that there would be enough missiles to pen-
etrate the U.S. BMD system in the aftermath of a hypothetical massive nuclear 
strike under any conflict scenario (if the Chinese tunnel storages have no mis-
siles in reserve). 
Apparently aware of this situation, China has been heavily investing in 
creating a sea-based component for its nuclear triad. However, access to the 
open ocean from China’s naval bases is restricted by the Japanese, Ryukyu, 
Taiwanese, Philippine, Malaysian, and Indonesian island chains, which the 
United States and Japan, with their powerful antisubmarine capabilities, as 
well as the South Korean and Taiwanese navies, can use to their advantage.
Still, China probably expects to ensure the combat survivability of its 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at sea by using other naval assets 
and coastal systems designed for countering the U.S. Navy. According to 
available sources,55 during the first stage of its naval buildup (up until 2015) 
China plans to create naval capacity (including coastal missiles) to effectively 
counter the fleets of the United States, Japan, and other nations in the Chinese 
“near zone”—the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea (there is 
a nuclear submarine naval base on Hainan Island). During the second stage 
(2015–2020) China would establish complete military superiority in those 
waters, while enabling its Navy to effectively counter the U.S. Navy in the 
“middle zone,” that is, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the seas 
of the Indonesian Archipelago, as well as within the ocean space up to the 
Marianas, the Caroline Islands, and New Guinea. During the subsequent 
phase (after 2020) China would expect to acquire military dominance in the 
“middle zone,” while in the “far zone” (to the Hawaiian Islands) it would 
counter the U.S. Navy. 
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China’s ambitious naval modernization plans also include the acquisition 
of naval bases and deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean in order to 
control the supply lines of energy resources from the Persian Gulf and Africa. 
The American-Japanese antisubmarine warfare systems are not the only 
threat to China’s strategic navy. China is also very concerned about the fact 
that U.S. BMD systems in Alaska and California (where GBIs are based) and 
Aegis-equipped U.S. warships, as well as Japanese military bases and ships 
(Aegis/SM-3), are able to counter Chinese SLBMs. A study conducted by 
Chinese experts, unique in its detail and technical calculations, shows that 
such a multilayered BMD would be quite effective against Chinese SLBMs 
launched from shallow coastal waters, where the submarines would be under 
the protection of the Chinese fleet and where they would be more difficult for 
the antisubmarine warfare systems of the United States and Japan to detect.56 
Although the Chinese nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines would 
be easier for an antisubmarine warfare force to counter if they should enter 
the open ocean, the BMD system described above would be incapable of inter-
cepting SLBMs launched against U.S. territory from southern azimuths. For 
the system to gain such a capability, it would have to be significantly strength-
ened with new space- and sea-based detection and tracking systems, as well 
as upgraded land- and sea-based interceptors. However, if the United States 
should set its goal as continuing to impede the growth of the Chinese missile 
potential, the United States will be capable of creating such a BMD system. 
Conventionally Armed Strategic Missiles
The United States has striven to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to 
meet its commitments to its allies by developing not only defensive weapons, 
but also offensive conventional weapons. 
This is a source of major concern in China, especially with regard to the 
development by the United States of long-range, conventionally armed preci-
sion-guided weapons: sea- and air-based cruise missiles combined with space-
based reconnaissance, targeting, and communication systems. 
The prospects that hypersonic precision conventional boost-glide systems 
could be created within the framework of the U.S. Prompt Global Strike con-
cept cause no less concern for China. The Chinese are also worried about the 
U.S. experiments with the X-37B spacecraft that took place in April 201057 
and the tests of various boost-glide systems.
Eugene Miasnikov has provided a detailed description of current and 
prospective precision-guided conventional weapons.58 Under the 2010 U.S. 
Nuclear Posture Review, all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are to be 
decommissioned. At the same time, long-range Tomahawk SLCMs will come 
to play an increasingly important role. They can be launched from the torpedo 
launchers and vertical launch systems on nearly all U.S. attack submarines. 
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The greatest striking power is held by the four Ohio-class ballistic missile sub-
marines that have been converted to launch SLCMs.59 Each of the subs, two 
of which have been deployed to the Pacific, can carry up to 154 Tomahawk 
SLCMs. The U.S. Navy has 53 strategic submarines in service, of which 30 are 
deployed in the Pacific Ocean.60 
The DDG-51 (Arleigh Burke-class) destroyers and CG-47 (Ticonderoga-
class) cruisers are equipped with vertical launchers and can launch BMD, anti-
aircraft, and antisubmarine warfare missiles. At the end of 2010, the U.S. Navy 
had 59 destroyers and 22 cruisers in service, of which 34 destroyers and twelve 
cruisers are deployed in the Pacific.61 CG-47 cruisers can carry a maximum of 
122 SLCMs. DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyers can have up to 90 and 80 
SLCMs, respectively, though the operational load of these missiles is usually a 
third to a half of their maximum size.62 
By 2020, the number of deployed SLCMs could reach as high as 1,600 
aboard U.S. Navy submarines and 4,700 aboard surface ships.63 At least 60 to 
70 percent of these will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean.
Conventional high-precision strikes against the territory of an adversary 
can also be carried out by U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft. Eleven U.S. air-
craft carriers are currently in service, which is expected to continue to 2020. 
The air wing of an aircraft carrier usually consists of 36 attack aircraft.64
The air-launched cruise missiles are deployed on heavy bombers. 
Conventionally armed bombers do not count in the New START Treaty’s 
allowed numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads, and the transparency and 
verification measures that apply to such weapons are very limited.65
According to Eugene Miasnikov, the main disadvantage of the cruise mis-
siles currently in service with the U.S. Air Force is their relatively low speed. 
In an effort to address this, the U.S. Navy has been developing hypersonic 
missiles under the RATTLRS program (Revolutionary Approach to Time-
Critical Long Range Strike). These missiles, which travel at Mach 4.5, would 
be used to attack coastal targets at ranges of up to 1,000 km. The ArcLight 
project being carried out by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
has the goal of creating a long-range, sea-based strike system based on the 
Standard SM-3 interceptor missile that could be equipped with a hypersonic 
glider with a warhead having an operational range exceeding 3,300 km. The 
missiles would be loaded into vertical launch systems aboard surface ships and 
submarines. The U.S. Air Force has joined with Boeing to develop the X-51A 
WaveRider hypersonic vehicle with a scramjet engine. This vehicle is expected 
to serve as the prototype for an air-launched missile that would have an opera-
tional range of up to 1,200 km and a speed of at least Mach 6.66
Systems capable of delivering a payload essentially anywhere in the world 
within one hour are being developed within the framework of the Prompt 
Global Strike program. For now, only ICBMs and SLBMs with nuclear war-
heads would be capable of meeting this requirement, and new systems of this 
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kind will not enter operational service before 2020.67 The development of 
the Prompt Global Strike program has been conducted in three main areas, 
aimed at testing the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (HTV-2), the Advanced 
Hypersonic Weapon, and the Conventional Strategic Missile.68 These systems 
use ballistic launchers and highly maneuverable guided hypersonic gliding 
vehicles. The first two flight tests of the HTV-2 were carried out in April 
2010 and August 2011. Both tests were conducted under similar scenarios. 
The launches took place at the Vandenberg Air Force Base space complex 
using the Minotaur IV Lite launch system (the four-stage “light” version, 
three stages of which came from the MX ICBM). Despite the failure of these 
tests, development of these systems continues.
It is interesting to note that just as Russia does, China projects the threat of 
the use of such weapons on itself alone. The conflict scenario that is widely and 
seriously considered in China is that any attempt by China to solve the Taiwan 
problem by force would lead to armed conflict with the United States.69 Still, 
the matter does not stop there. Despite the vast financial and economic inter-
dependence between the two powers, sharp disputes can be expected between 
them as they vie for dominance in the Western Pacific. A growing China will 
consider this region its natural area of vital strategic, military, and political 
interest, while the United States will not give up its current dominance in a 
region where it has made large-scale economic and political investments and 
has commitments to allies and partners.
At the strategic level, Beijing’s great apprehension concerns the possibility 
of counterforce conventional strikes against its nuclear forces. It should be 
noted that Russia is also concerned about such a possibility as applied to itself, 
having 170 road-mobile ICBMs and 150 silo-based missiles on high alert in 
addition to other components of its nuclear triad and powerful tactical nuclear 
assets.70 Aside from that, Russian military doctrine has made it clear that any 
massive attack on Russian nuclear forces using precision-guided weapons 
would invite a nuclear strike in retaliation. 
Thus, it is understandable why Beijing would be so concerned, considering 
the fact that China has no more than 50 ICBMs that would be able to reach 
U.S. territory. The likelihood of a U.S. counterforce attack using precision-
guided conventional weapons undercuts China’s sacramental nuclear doctrine 
based on an unconditional commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. This 
obligation implies that China would not retaliate with nuclear arms if attacked 
by conventional precision-guided weapons. In any case, Beijing fears that the 
United States would expect China to hesitate in such circumstances, unless it 
adjusts its doctrine. 
Meanwhile, China attaches great political importance to its commitment 
on no first use of nuclear weapons. If Beijing makes an exception for the case 
of an attack against it with conventional weapons, then the Chinese nuclear 
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doctrine would not in essence be different from that of Russia or a number of 
other states, and it would lose its unique nature. 
The military and political situation in the Western Pacific is further compli-
cated by the intertwining of offensive and defensive conventional systems and 
potential scenarios of military combat. China probably believes that the U.S. 
precision-guided conventional weapons would be able to complete massive 
and multiple disarming strikes against its own conventional precision-guided 
missiles (and their command systems) designed to make strikes against the U.S. 
Navy, in particular against aircraft carriers and SLCM- and BMD-equipped 
warships. The advanced hypersonic boost-glide vehicles of the Prompt Global 
Strike program that are being developed by the United States could presum-
ably penetrate the dense, multilayered air-defense system that shields China’s 
own coastal missile launchers.
China puts great emphasis on such conventional systems in its military 
policy, first and foremost on medium-range ballistic missiles with precision-
guided conventional warheads targeted at U.S. Navy ships (in particular, 
around Taiwan) and American bases on the territory of U.S. allies. These 
mainly include the DongFeng-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles with 
self-guided warheads and the DongFeng-15 (CSS-6) and DongFeng-11 (CSS-7) 
short-range ballistic missiles, as well as conventional DongFey-10 (CSS-X-10) 
ground-launched cruise missiles.71 According to various estimates, 300 to 500 
Chinese tactical ballistic missiles are deployed at coastal areas and can make 
strikes on Taiwan.
China has made significant achievements in developing these weapons: 
Chinese DongFeng-15 (CSS-6) missiles can reach American aircraft carri-
ers at distances of 1,000 km from the coast, and the DongFeng-21D (CSS-5) 
medium-range ballistic missiles can hit targets as far as 2,200 km from the 
coast. The new conventional DongFeng-25 medium-range missile, for instance, 
was designed to force the U.S. fleet to remain at a distance of 3,200 km from 
the coast, which is far beyond the operational range of carrier-based aircraft 
or even of the Tomahawk SLCMs based on cruisers and destroyers. These 
Chinese missiles are armed with hypersonic gliding guided warheads. To pro-
vide these missiles with targeting and guidance information, China has imple-
mented large-scale programs aimed at developing orbital, stratospheric, and 
air-based reconnaissance and targeting systems.72
In this regard, the Chinese professional military literature emphasizes that 
in a crisis situation these offensive weapons should be used for a first strike 
once an adversary’s warships have entered the range of the Chinese missiles.73 
If this tactic is applied in practice, any future crisis over Taiwan could spiral 
out of political control and develop into an armed conflict with subsequent 
unmanageable escalation.
For their part, the United States and its allies have been deploying their 
sea- and land-based BMD systems, which among other things are assigned 
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the mission of countering any Chinese attacks made by high-precision conven-
tionally armed weapons against allied warships or land-based sites in Japan, 
the Philippines, South Korea, or Taiwan. This interweaving of military tech-
nical and strategic factors and contradictions significantly complicates any 
possible efforts to limit arms and agree on confidence-building measures in 
the region, and in some aspects globally.
China and Nuclear Arms Limitations
Contrary to widespread opinion, relations between China and Russia on many 
arms control issues are no closer than are relations between the United States 
and Russia or the United States and China.
For the foreseeable future, U.S.-Russian relations will continue to share a 
common position that runs counter to Chinese policy in the following mat-
ters: the two powers refuse to accept the Chinese demand that they uncon-
ditionally commit to no first use of nuclear weapons; they refuse to declare 
that nuclear weapons will never be used or threatened to be used against a 
non-nuclear-weapon state; they intend (or at least proclaim they do) to develop 
missile defense systems jointly (China was not invited to join this process); 
they strive to make China’s nuclear forces and development programs more 
transparent and open; they call for China’s urgent involvement in the disar-
mament process; they refuse to sign any treaty (or convention) on universal 
nuclear disarmament within specified time limits or any declaration making 
nuclear weapons “illegal”; and they refuse to withdraw nuclear security guar-
antees to their allies. 
For their part, the United States and China have joined position against 
Russia in trying to ensure that the next strategic arms reduction treaty will 
impose significant cuts in nuclear weapons; trying to limit U.S. and Russian 
nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons (China has not yet been mentioned in 
this respect); and hoping to limit U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons in storage.
Finally, Russia and China, unlike the United States, agree on the need to 
impose limits on global and regional BMD systems; to limit conventionally 
armed precision-guided weapons; and to set limits on space-based and strate-
gic boost-glide suborbital strike weapons. They have also labeled unacceptable 
the NATO proposal to have Russia redeploy its nonstrategic nuclear arms 
from west to east.
Apart from the United States and Russia, China is the only country that has 
the economic and technical capability to conduct a multifold buildup of its 
SNFs over the course of the next ten to fifteen years. Even the simple expedi-
ent of replacing single-warhead missiles with MIRVed missiles would increase 
the total number of warheads by five to six times (compared to the current 
level of 200 warheads). This is what happened with the U.S. SNFs during the 
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first half of the 1970s and the Soviet Union’s strategic forces during the second 
half of the same decade. 
Therefore, the need has already emerged for the Chinese nuclear forces 
and development programs to be taken into consideration in discussing any 
subsequent Russian-American strategic arms limitation agreement following 
the New START Treaty. 
In this regard France and Great Britain are different, in that they are U.S. 
allies, their nuclear forces are being reduced, they are relatively open and pre-
dictable, and they lack and are not expected to have in the future the capability 
of rapidly increasing their nuclear arsenals. 
This is why transparency is so important, as it would clarify the actual size 
and characteristics of China’s nuclear forces and their potential for buildup. 
China’s official position is that “countries possessing the largest nuclear 
arsenals . . . should further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals in a veri-
fiable, irreversible and legally binding manner, so as to create the necessary 
conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. When conditions 
are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states should also join in multilateral 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”74 
At first glance, the total sizes of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals appear 
vastly greater than China’s, considering all of the different classes of combat-
ready and stored missiles, even with adjustment made for possible additional 
missiles that China may have stored in its tunnel systems (figure 2). According 
to independent estimates, the two great powers enjoy at least a six- to seven-
fold superiority over China.
Figure 2. Estimated Aggregate Nuclear Weapons
Note: Dotted lines represent possible number of weapons in tunnels
Sources: Viktor Esin, “China’s Nuclear Capability,” Prospects of China’s Participation in Nuclear Arms 
Limitations, edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 
2012), 26; “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, edited by Bates Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 308.
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If only systems covered by the New START Treaty are considered, the 
superiority of the United States and Russia appears even more significant 
(see figure 3). 
Figure 3. Number of Nuclear Weapons Under the 
New START Treaty’s Counting Rules
Note: Dotted lines represent possible number of weapons in tunnels 
Sources: Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, November 30, 2012, www.state.gov/documents/organization/201428.pdf; “World 
Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 328.
This ratio slightly changes in China’s favor by adding intermediate-, 
medium-, and short-range missiles (ranges of 500–5,500 km), which were dis-
mantled by the United States and the Soviet Union under the INF Treaty. 
Since China was not a party to this agreement, but the Chinese weapons of 
these categories can reach Russian territory and that of some American allies 
(such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as India, there is a certain 
logic to including intermediate- and shorter-range missiles of the three coun-
tries in the comparison, in addition to all strategic weapons (figure 4). 
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
N
um
be
r o
f N
uc
le
ar
 W
ea
po
ns
Russia United States China
1,499
1,722
93
100
32 | The Great Strategic Triangle 
Figure 4. Number of Nuclear Weapons Under the New 
START and 1987 INF Treaties’ Counting Rules
Note: Dotted lines represent possible number of weapons in tunnels
Sources: Viktor Esin, “China’s Nuclear Capability,” 26; “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 308.
Since there is a discussion about possible further reduction of U.S. and 
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and about the need to take into account 
China’s nuclear weapons, a time frame of ten to fifteen years should be taken 
into consideration. Over this period, China will be able not only to increase 
the number of its nuclear launchers but also to replace its single-warhead mis-
siles with MIRVed missiles currently under development—DongFeng-41 and 
DongFeng-25. Thus it makes sense to compare the three countries’ three classes 
of land-based missiles by the number of launchers and delivery vehicles, which 
serve as the basis for a possible warhead buildup.
Moreover, these launchers and delivery systems are much easier to verify 
than warheads. That is why the first agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union—the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I 
Interim Agreement—limited the number of missiles by restricting the num-
ber of launchers (instead of warheads). Later launchers were included in the 
limits set by SALT II, START I, and the Prague New START Treaty. 
Thus, when comparing the three powers’ nuclear weapons using the 
described criteria and taking into account the above considerations, the asym-
metry between them turns out to be rather insignificant (see figure 5). No 
doubt Russia and the United States would remain hugely superior in sea- and 
air-based strategic weapons, which would stay out of the initial scope of arms 
control. However, China’s right to expand these legs of its strategic triad would 
not be limited either. It is worthwhile to remember that the 1972 SALT I did 
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not put limits on aircraft because of great disparity between the two parties. 
It was reasonable to start with limitations on systems in which the sides had 
approximate equality and postpone other systems for future agreements. 
Figure 5. Number of Land-Based Missiles Under the New 
START and 1987 INF Treaties’ Counting Rules
Sources: Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic 
Offensive Arms; Viktor Esin “China’s Nuclear Capability,” 27–30; “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 328.
As the forty-year experience of U.S.-Russian negotiations has demonstrated, 
approximate parity in forces is an essential precondition for concluding strategic 
arms limitation agreements. The military balance discussed above for the cat-
egories examined, in the presence of other favorable conditions, could become 
a basis for agreement between the great powers.
As for the information disclosure issue, Beijing has officially demanded that 
the United States (and, by default, Russia) commit itself to no first use of nuclear 
weapons before China will agree to increase transparency with regard to its 
nuclear forces. 
Although at first glance this demand might appear convincing, in reality it 
is groundless. Official information from Beijing on the numbers of its nuclear 
weapons would be of no assistance in targeting a disarming strike by the United 
States or another state, which would have to rely on its own intelligence informa-
tion to plan such attacks, especially since Beijing’s official information would not 
have to include any precise positioning data for all of its strategic assets.
However, if China were to increase the transparency of its nuclear forces 
and programs, it would greatly help Moscow and Washington to plan future 
START treaties.
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In reality, China appears to see transparency as its most important bargain-
ing chip. In addition, substantial transparency would lead to indirect limi-
tation of China’s nuclear forces due to Beijing’s long-reiterated declarations 
about the “minimal sufficiency” of its forces, its lack of desire to achieve parity 
with the United States or Russia, and its reluctance to join the arms race. The 
situation with the notorious tunnel system will then be especially sensitive.
Therefore, it is unlikely that China could be persuaded to open up informa-
tion about its nuclear forces as a gesture of goodwill, a first step, or a mini-
mum contribution to the transition to multilateral disarmament. In the best 
case, Beijing can be expected to be a tough bargainer over this issue and try 
to trade off each specific element of transparency for the most it can get from 
the other parties. 
Preconditions for Chinese Participation 
in the Arms Reduction Process
Nevertheless, it would appear possible to gradually engage China in the 
nuclear arms limitation process, although this will not happen by merely 
announcing rhetorically that the number of participants in the process should 
be increased. It will not be possible to “teach” China the Russian-American 
lessons; Beijing will form its own position. China’s involvement would be real-
istic on only a strictly pragmatic basis, that is, once it has concluded that its 
concessions with regard to transparency and specific weapons systems will be 
paid off by the concessions made by the United States (and, indirectly, Russia) 
in matters of concern to Beijing.
Beijing considers the New START Treaty to be an intermediate docu-
ment that had been negotiated hastily in order to replace 
START I, which expired in 2009. It believes that the 
treaty, in a sense, is a pale imitation of real strategic arms 
reduction (minimal actual reductions, peculiar counting 
rules, reduction of warheads by stockpiling, and the like). 
To seriously approach at least a theoretical discussion of 
any limitations of its nuclear weapons, China is awaiting as 
a minimum a new U.S.-Russian treaty similar to START 
that would actually reduce the strategic forces of the two 
countries (for example, to 1,000 warheads). 
It is clear that prospects for the next strategic offensive 
arms reduction treaty are in doubt due to disagreements over such issues as 
missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and political matters.
In addition, China insists that the United States (and, by default, Russia) 
abandon the first-use concept and recognize the existence of mutual nuclear 
deterrence based on mutual vulnerability. For the United States, to take such 
To seriously approach at least a theoretical 
discussion of any limitations of its nuclear 
weapons, China is awaiting as a minimum 
a new U.S.-Russian treaty similar to 
START that would actually reduce the 
strategic forces of the two countries.
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steps would be fraught with complications, in that its relations with its allies 
depend upon security guarantees (including nuclear ones) from Washington, 
while Russia would perceive such a transformation as being a threat to its 
own security in the west and the east. This would be especially true in light of 
China’s geostrategic advantages near Siberia and the Far East and also given 
China’s growing superiority in conventional forces.
Therefore, to get China to participate in the nuclear disarmament process 
would not only be a matter of Beijing’s changing its position, but also the 
problem of introducing fundamental and perhaps painful changes in the mili-
tary policies of the United States and Russia.
If Washington and Moscow seriously wish to pursue transparency or limi-
tation of the Chinese nuclear forces, rhetorical statements or appeals to Article 
VI of the NPT will remain as fruitless as before. The two leading powers must 
soberly assess what they would be prepared to sacrifice in terms of reducing 
and limiting their own weapons and modernization programs in exchange for 
corresponding concessions made by China. It appears that Beijing will not 
agree to anything short of this will continue to follow its “vicious circle” pol-
icy, demanding that the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear forces to 
levels closer to China’s, while not revealing what these levels are. 
It appears that the following conditions will need to be met before China 
“opens up” step-by-step and limits its strategic weapons (at least by commit-
ting itself not to increase them):
The United States must commit not to further build up its sea- and land-
based BMD assets in the Pacific Ocean (this condition depends on its ally 
Japan as well). The current multilayered BMD system in the Pacific is adequate 
to counter North Korean missile launches, and any further development will 
be increasingly seen as having an anti-Chinese purpose.
• The United States and Russia must make a commitment that China would 
be able to take part in any BMD cooperation efforts that the two powers 
agree to conduct under the framework of specific projects (for example, on 
missile launch detection data exchange), in a manner it found acceptable.
• One such project might be the Asia-Pacific Joint Data Exchange Center, 
which would provide data on missile launches in a similar manner to the 
Russia-United States and Russia-NATO centers, which the countries had 
initiated and discussed in relation to Europe but which never became 
operational. Such a trilateral Russian-U.S.-Chinese facility in Asia could 
also be open to representatives of India, Japan, South Korea, and other 
states that comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, which 
should officially admit both China and India. 
• The United States and Russia must initiate negotiations on the next stra-
tegic offensive arms reduction treaty, which would include limitations on 
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conventionally armed strategic weapon systems. This would fulfill the 
necessary precondition for China to also limit its high-precision missiles 
armed with conventional warheads, which are indistinguishable from the 
nuclear. Thus it would be possible to regulate the unfolding regional arms 
race involving advanced high-precision missiles.
• Progress must be made in limiting U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons (excluding their redeployment from Europe to Asia in spite of 
the NATO position). This would establish the necessary conditions for 
limiting the Chinese intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. 
The first, second, and fourth points above would be indirect recognition by 
the two leading powers of mutual vulnerability and relations based on mutual 
nuclear deterrence with China. Both the U.S. commitments to its allies and 
the defense of Russia’s eastern frontiers will need to be provided by conven-
tional forces, as well as through political or economic means. 
The most likely format for negotiations would be to conduct bilateral talks 
between the United States and China in parallel with START negotiations 
between the United States and Russia, with regular strategic consultations 
held between Russia and China.
Although three- or four-party negotiations would be 
very complicated, such a format would nevertheless be 
possible, for example, for cooperating in the BMD field 
(missile launch data exchange).
Over the longer term, trilateral agreements among the 
United States, Russia, and China could be possible for lim-
iting strategic and nonstrategic weapons, for example, by 
imposing equal aggregate ceilings for land-based ICBMs 
plus medium-range and tactical missiles (with ranges over 
500 km). As noted above, the aggregate levels of the three 
countries are approximately equal. Of course, weapons 
with corresponding characteristics that can presumably 
be stored in China’s tunnel systems would also need to be 
included. In the spirit of the New START Treaty, additional ceilings could be 
set for these missiles, as for non-deployed launchers and missiles. 
The fact that the United States and Russia have dismantled their intermedi-
ate- and shorter-range missiles should be considered, while China would be 
able to remove its intermediate-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range mis-
siles and replace them with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia and (even 
more so) the United States would be unlikely to welcome such a prospect but 
would have to acknowledge that without an agreement, China would be able 
to do this in any case, or could even increase the number of its intercontinental 
missiles in addition to its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.
The most likely format for negotiations 
would be to conduct bilateral talks 
between the United States and China 
in parallel with START negotiations 
between the United States and Russia, 
with regular strategic consultations 
held between Russia and China.
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Conclusion
In political and military strategic terms, the Great Triangle of the Asia-Pacific 
region (Russia, the United States, and China) is playing an increasingly impor-
tant role. For the foreseeable future, its significance in the world economy and 
international security of the Asia-Pacific will also continue to grow. The way 
events there unfold will have a tremendous impact on the level of conflicts 
around the world, the dynamics of military competition between states, and 
the prospects for arms limitation and nonproliferation.
At the same time, the strategic relationships within the troika are very het-
erogeneous and asymmetrical. They do not have common ground (that is, 
principles of stability or parity) in either political or strategic terms. Thus, the 
“triangle” is not only not equal-sided, but also not homogeneous. 
The history of strategic relations between Russia and the United States is 
long and based upon approximate nuclear parity and mutual nuclear deterrence 
through mutually assured destruction as a result of a retaliatory strike. The 
two countries have forty years of experience in negotiations and agreements 
on arms limitation and reduction and on strengthening strategic stability.
These objectively determined relations will continue in the future, despite 
such “perturbing” factors as BMD systems, conventional long-range offen-
sive weapons, and the impact of nonstrategic nuclear arms. These circumstan-
tial factors have for now brought the negotiations to a standstill. Nevertheless, 
the state of the military balance over the next ten to fifteen years will remain 
essentially the same. Therefore, an enduring basis will remain for resuming 
the negotiation process and resolving the new problems that have emerged.
 China’s approach to strategic stability differs from that of Russia or the 
United States. It is not based on approximate nuclear and missile parity and 
the concept of mutually assured destruction (by retaliatory strike). At the same 
time, China is the only one of the five great powers and permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and NPT-designated nuclear-weapon states that 
has not disclosed any official factual information on its nuclear forces or their 
development programs.
In the past, when China’s GDP, military budget, and nuclear forces had 
been rather modest, this situation was quietly accepted by the other pow-
ers, but over the last decade, China’s economic growth, its military budget 
(which has become second only to that of the United States), and its large-scale 
nuclear and conventional modernization programs argue against taking the 
word of the Chinese when they make assertions about their “strictly defensive 
nuclear doctrine,” no-first-use policy, and maintaining “minimally necessary” 
nuclear forces. 
The main paradox of China’s nuclear doctrine is that if its nuclear forces 
are as limited as the majority of foreign experts think, then it will not be 
capable of making a retaliatory strike and operationally will most likely be 
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oriented toward a preemptive strike. The Chinese second-strike capability will 
be viable only if there is a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and missiles 
stored in the underground tunnels, which would need to be highly surviv-
able and unknown to a potential adversary even if not available for imme-
diate launch. If this is not the case, Chinese authorities should explain why 
the apparent vulnerability of their deployed forces to a disarming first strike 
neither deprives them of a second-strike capability nor implies that China has 
its own operational plans and capabilities to conduct a preemptive strike, in 
contrast to its declaratory doctrine of no first use.
This would mean that China’s nuclear capability would apparently be 
greater than that of the next six nuclear-weapon states combined. At the same 
time, China’s economic and technical might would allow it to build up its 
nuclear weapons rapidly. 
The “Chinese factor” should be taken into account when developing any 
new U.S. or Russian nuclear arms limitation or reduction initiatives both 
under the framework of the negotiations process and in terms of unilateral 
goodwill measures. However, current U.S. and Russian policies quite naively 
call upon China to join the process of nuclear disarmament, “open up” its 
forces and programs, or, at least, commit itself to not increasing the size of its 
nuclear arsenal based simply on China’s obligations under Article VI of the 
NPT or as a goodwill gesture and contribution to the noble cause of nuclear 
disarmament. 
This situation is further complicated by regional problems, the grow-
ing disagreements between China, its neighbors, and the United States, and 
the deployment of advanced BMD systems in the Asia-Pacific region by the 
United States and its allies, as well as the new arms race in naval armaments 
and conventionally armed, precision-guided long-range strike systems. 
This means that China will only join this process once it has concluded 
that its concessions with regard to transparency and specific weapons systems 
limitations will be paid off by the concessions made by the United States (and, 
by default, Russia) in matters of concern to Beijing. In particular, China will 
use the transparency issue as a critical bargaining chip in order to obtain sig-
nificant U.S. concessions. 
In a sense, the possibility of China joining the nuclear arms control process 
is not a matter of merely getting Beijing to change its traditional position. It 
also would require the United States and Russia to revise their military policies.
 The following conditions must be met in order for China to gradually 
“open up” information on its nuclear potential and subsequently limit its stra-
tegic weapons (at least by committing itself not to increase the numbers of 
certain classes and types): a U.S. commitment to refrain from enhancing its 
sea- and land-based BMD assets in the Pacific Ocean (possibly including mis-
sile defense in Japan as well); a U.S. and Russian commitment to allow China 
to participate in any specific projects of cooperation on BMD development 
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(for example, missile detection data exchange) that the two powers may agree 
on, in a format that is acceptable to China; and initiation of U.S.-Russian nego-
tiations on the next strategic offensive arms reduction treaty, which would 
include limits on conventional precision-guided long-range missiles.
Any negotiations most likely will be conducted in the form of a bilateral 
dialogue between the United States and China carried out in parallel with the 
START talks between the United States and Russia and accompanied by regu-
lar, strategic consultations between Russia and China.
Trilateral or four-party negotiations (by engaging India as well) would be 
very complicated. The only exception could be in the area of cooperation on 
BMD (missile detection data exchange). Trilateral agreements on the limita-
tion of certain offensive weapons could also be possible over the longer term.
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